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THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CROWN 
AND MAORI IN NEW ZEALAND 
Noel Cox* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE orthodox legitimacy of the Crown,1 in those countries 
that derive their constitutional principles from Great 
Britain, is the legitimacy of the inherited legal form.  So 
long as government is conducted in accordance with the rule of 
law, and meets the aspirations of the majority of the population, 
the legitimacy of the government based on such a ground has 
been little questioned.   
This legitimacy alone, however, is not necessarily sufficient.  
Nor does it alone explain the general acceptance of the current 
regime in New Zealand.  There exists a second, potentially po-
tent, source of legitimacy in New Zealand — the Treaty of Wai-
tangi (“Treaty”).  As the moral, if not legal, authority for Euro-
pean settlement of New Zealand, this 1840 compact between 
the Crown and Maori chiefs has become increasingly important 
as a constitutional founding document for New Zealand.2  As a 
party to the Treaty, the Crown may have acquired a new and 
significant source of legitimacy as the body with which the 
Maori have a partnership.  It is also a source of legitimacy that 
  
 * Lecturer in Law at the Auckland University of Technology.  LL.M. 
(Hons.), Ph.D.  Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand, and of the Su-
preme Courts of Tasmania, New South Wales, South Australia, and the 
Northern Territory.  The author can be contacted at noel.cox@aut.ac.nz. 
 1. “The Crown” refers to the “[l]oose voluntary association of political 
entities, nearly all of which give symbolic or actual allegiance to the British 
crown, or did so at one time or another.”  FUNK &  WAGNALLS NEW 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2000), LEXIS, Nexis Library, Legal Reference.  See also Noel 
Cox, Republican Sentiment in the realms of the Queen: The New Zealand Per-
spective, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 121, 141 n.160 (2002) (“Crown is defined as ‘Her 
majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand.’” (quoting the State-Owned En-
terprises Act, § 2 (1986) (N.Z.))). 
 2. Richard  Mulgan, Can the Treaty of Waitangi Provide a Constitutional 
Basis for New Zealand’s Political Future?, 41 POL. SCI. 51, 57 (1989).  But see 
Susan Pepperell, Right Time to Leave, Says Upton, WAIKATO TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 30349943 (quoting Simon Upton, Member of 
Parliament, Address before the Parliament of New Zealand, Dec. 12, 2000). 
T 
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belongs specifically to the Crown as a symbol of government.  
The purpose of this article is to examine and assess this source 
of legitimacy.   
The first section of this article looks at the place of indigenous 
peoples vis-à-vis the Crown.  It will evaluate the nature of the 
relationship established with the Crown during the course of 
colonial expansion and its relevance for the native peoples to-
day.  In particular it will examine the development of the con-
cept of fiduciary duty.  The second section looks at the New Zea-
land situation, and specifically at the Treaty.  This Treaty is 
evaluated both as a source of legitimacy — as a direct agree-
ment between the Crown and Maori tribes — and as a possible 
cause for questioning the legitimacy of the Government of New 
Zealand, due to the Treaty’s partial fulfillment and lingering 
uncertainties as to its meaning and application.  The third sec-
tion looks at the Maori attitude toward the monarchy, and in 
particular, the legitimacy derived from the Treaty.  This section 
seeks to bring together the concepts identified in the previous 
sections and to identify some of the factors that Maori have con-
sidered important aspects of the Crown-Maori relationship.  
Each section is important because it explains a possible source 
of legitimacy.  But contained within each are also dangers in-
herent in analyzing political structures that are founded in dis-
parate cultural histories, in this case the difference between the 
culture of the indigenous Maori people and that of the Euro-
pean settlers (known to the Maori as “Pakeha”). 
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE CROWN 
The Crown has a special role as trustee for the indigenous 
peoples of Canada, New Zealand, and to a lesser degree, Austra-
lia.  In each country the Crown assumed, and still discharges, 
certain responsibilities for what in New Zealand are called the 
tangata whenua — the “people of the land.”3  As such the Crown 
occupies a symbolic place distinct from, yet linked with, the 
  
 3. Benedict Kingsbury, Competing Conceptual Approaches to Indigenous 
Group Issues in New Zealand Law, 52 U. TORONTO L.J . 101, 125–26 (2002).  A 
phrase that has strong parallels with autochthony.  Autochthony is the status 
of being based solely on local sources and not dependent upon the continuing 
legal or other authority of an outside source.  PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF CANADA  44–49 (1992). 
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government of the day.4  Though the Maori and European popu-
lations have become increasingly intermingled, the role of the 
Crown has remained important as guarantor of Maori property. 
In New Zealand the Crown has become national — histori-
cally and politically similar to what happened in Canada, but 
distinct from what developed in Australia.  In both New Zea-
land and Canada, the Crown made treaties regulating its rela-
tions with the aboriginal inhabitants of the new colonies.  These 
treaties, combined with the circumstances of settlement, cre-
ated an ongoing duty on the part of the Crown towards the na-
tive peoples of these countries.   
The Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 by emissaries of the 
Queen of Great Britain and many indigenous Maori chiefs, has 
long been regarded as New Zealand’s founding document.5  
Since its signing, the Treaty has been viewed as an unqualified 
cession of sovereignty to the British Imperial Government, or as 
a permit for the settler population to administer its own affairs 
in consultation with the Maori.6  Its exact legal significance was 
uncertain.  However, it seems that the Crown gave implicit rec-
ognition to the Maori as the indigenous inhabitants of the coun-
try,7 both in the Treaty and in its prior and subsequent conduct 
towards Maori.  The acquisition of sovereignty, implicit in the 
Treaty, was not acquired in a legal or political vacuum.  Never-
theless, the legal effect of the treaty was not as important as its 
political function.  Both the British Imperial Government and 
  
 4. See Janine Hayward, Commentary, in CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF MMP 233–234 (Alan Simpson ed., 1998) (stating that the Crown is increas-
ingly seen by Maori in this light). 
 5. See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims of Indigenous Popula-
tions: The View from Common Law, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). 
 6. See Betty Carter, The Incorporation of the Treaty of Waitangi into Mu-
nicipal Law, 4 AUKLAND U. L. REV. 1 (1980–83).  See also J.G.A. Pocock, Law 
Sovereignty and History in a Divided Culture: The Case of New Zealand and 
the Treaty of Waitangi, 43 MCGILL L.J. 481, 489–91 (1998). 
 7. At least, such has been the widespread view, now given the backing of 
both politicians and courts.  See, e.g., New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-
General [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641; but see, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attor-
ney-General [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 576 (the 1992 case could be seen as a partial 
reversal of the 1987 case).   
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the Maori chiefs knew that it was the culmination of a process 
that had begun some decades earlier.8 
Taking the lead from a number of court decisions,9 govern-
ments of the  former colonies have increasingly sought to apply 
the concept of partnership among the settlers and the indige-
nous population.  In both Canada and New Zealand this rela-
tionship has not always been smooth, but the courts have rec-
ognised its importance.  The New Zealand government has fol-
lowed the direction set by the courts,10 just as it has happened 
in Canada11 and in the United States of America.12 
A. Canada 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen13 ac-
knowledged the existence of a fiduciary obligation of the Crown 
towards the Canadian Indians.14  The court clearly stated that 
the exercise of discretion or power over property, above and be-
yond what people are normally subject to, leads to accountabil-
ity in law.15  Since successive governments in Canada have long 
assumed the right to control, manage, and dispose of Indian 
lands, a fiduciary obligation has rested with the Crown.16  This 
  
 8. Noel Cox, The Evolution of the New Zealand Monarchy: The Recogni-
tion of an Autochthonous Polity 78 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Auckland) (on file with author). 
 9. See, e.g., New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 
N.Z.L.R. 641 (C.A.). 
 10. Interview with Douglas Graham, former Minister in Charge of Treaty 
of Waitangi Negotiations, in Auckland, N. Z. (Nov. 24, 1999). 
 11. Joseph Borrows, A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First 
Nations Self-Government (1991) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of 
Toronto) (on file with author); Richard H. Bartlett, The Fiduciary Obligation 
of the Crown to the Indians , 53 SASK. L. REV. 301, 302–03 (1989); BRUCE 
CLARK, NATIVE LIBERTY, CROWN SOVEREIGNTY — THE EXISTING ABORIGINAL 
RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 11–57 (1990). 
 12. See Janis Searles, Note, Another Supreme Court Move Away from Rec-
ognition of Tribal Sovereignty, 25 ENVTL. L. 209, 235–36 (1995). 
 13. Guerin v. The Queen [1985] 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321. 
 14. See Richard H. Bartlett, You Can’t Trust the Crown: The Fiduciary 
Obligation of the Crown to the Indians: Guerin v. The Queen, 49 SASK. L.  REV. 
367, 372–73 (1984–85). 
 15. Guerin, 13 D.L.R. at 340.  For discussion of principles of law in fiduci-
ary relationships see Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 
(1984) 55 A.L.R. 417 (Austl.) and Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 790 (Can.).   
 16. Bartlett, supra note 11, at 302–03. 
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obligation was founded both on imperial practice and the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763.17 
The Royal Proclamation, which had the status of an Imperial 
Act of Parliament18 and thus could not be repealed by the Ca-
nadian Parliament (until the passage of the Statute of West-
minster of 193119), had guaranteed the native North American 
Indians possession of hunting grounds and the protection of the 
Crown.20  “In restricting the alienation of Indian lands, the 
Crown assumed responsibility for the protection and manage-
ment of Indian proprietary interests.”21  In this respect there 
are strong parallels with the situation in New Zealand.  But the 
Canadian federal constitutional arrangements saw a more 
marked division of powers than what was seen in a unitary 
state like New Zealand. 
Today the Crown-in-Parliament has sovereignty in Canada, 
but aboriginal peoples have legislative jurisdiction, from which 
non-natives are excluded.22  In a similar way, the federal and 
provincial governments of Canada today are subordinate to the 
Constitution and can exercise only the powers delegated to 
them by the Constitution.23 
The only government with true sovereignty during the colo-
nial era was the British Imperial Government.24  But the impe-
  
 17. The Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, R.S.C., c. I-5, app. 1 (1985) 
(Can.) [hereinafter Royal Proclamation]. 
 18. See The King v. McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68, 72 (Can.).  However, 
this is only because the Crown can legislate by proclamation or order in coun-
cil for colonies.  Id.  The general power to legislate by proclamation was re-
jected in the Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1354 (K.B. 1611). 
 19. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. V, c. 4 (U.K.). 
 20. Royal Proclamation, supra note 17.  But it included the right of pre-
emption. 
 21. Darlene M. Johnston, A Theory of Crown Trust Towards Aboriginal 
Peoples, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 307, 329 (1986). 
 22. CLARK, supra note 11, at 3. 
 23. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII (General), § 52.  See 
also JACQUELINE R. CASTEL & OMEELA K. LATCHMAN, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
CANADIAN LEGAL RESEARCH 4 (2d ed. 1996); BERNARD W. FUNSTON & EUGENE 
MEEHAN, CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 105 (1994). 
 24. However, there were claims to the contrary by American colonials in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  In the chartered colonies the local 
assembly elected the governor, enacted laws repugnant to English law, de-
clined to recognize Admiralty jurisdiction or appeal rights, neglected to pro-
vide their quotas for imperial defence, and encouraged trades forbidden by 
imperial legislation.  In short, they were politically independent, and claimed 
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rial government in its dealings in North America also sought to 
maintain an “even hand” between the Indians and the colonial 
governments.25  Partly for this reason, they circumscribed the 
power of the colonial government, and therefore their federal 
and provincial successors.26  
Throughout Canadian history, the colonial governments were 
constitutionally bound to respect aboriginal rights, because they 
were never invested with sufficient legal power to abrogate such 
rights.27  These rights were later formally announced in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 and in the instructions to the gov-
ernors.  However, in accordance with the Colonial Laws Valid-
ity Act of 1865,28 the colonial legislature had the power to enact 
laws that were prejudicial to the aboriginals.   
The native peoples of Canada enjoyed constitutional immu-
nity, not merely federal immunity.29  Thus they had certain 
rights, such as of land ownership, which depended upon the 
constitution, rather than upon federal laws.30   
Developments in the courts during the 1970s has led to a re-
surgence of native authority.31  In Calder v. Attorney-General 
for British Columbia,32 the Supreme Court of Canada assumed 
that the pre-confederation colonial government in British Co-
lumbia was granted by the British Imperial Government, as 
  
legal independence as well.  See SIR DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 352 (7th ed. 1964). 
 25. The Queen v. Taylor, [1981] 34 O.R.2d 360, 367 (Can.).  More recently, 
the courts have observed that, in dealing with the native Americans, “the 
honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance of ‘sharp dealing’ 
should be sanctioned.”  Id.   
 26. CLARK, supra note 11, at 58–63. 
 27. See Mark D. Walters, Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and Exclusive 
Rights to Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada, 23 QUEEN’S L.J. 301, 364–
65 (1998). 
 28. Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.).  Sections 3 
and 4 abolished the former theory and practice that colonial legislatures must 
respect the fundamental principles of English law.  Id. §§ 3–4. 
 29. See Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and 
United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 682–83 (1991). 
 30. See, e.g., Royal Proclamation, supra note 17.  Since 1982 there has been 
constitutional entrenchment for these rights under section 35 of the Constitu-
tion Act of 1982.  CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (Rights of the 
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), § 35(1). 
 31. Graham Interview, supra note 10.  See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General 
for British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 395. 
 32. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 395. 
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opposed to regal sovereign power, sufficient to extinguish the 
aboriginal rights to the territory the Crown had not purchased.  
But even the federal government’s powers at the time of confed-
eration were not sovereign.33  
Canadian courts have led the way to the recognition of a spe-
cial relationship between the Crown and native peoples.34  Fol-
lowing its tentative recognition in Calder,35 the court in Guerin 
v. The Queen authoritatively established that the Crown may be 
held accountable for its role in the management and disposition 
of aboriginal land and resources.36  Four judges held that a fidu-
ciary obligation only arose if the land was surrendered,37 while 
three held that a more general obligation to protect the land 
interests of aborigines existed.38  The minority was followed in 
The Queen v. Sparrow.39  
While imbued with an ongoing responsibility for the native 
peoples, the Crown enjoys a special position in the Canadian 
political system; this position was initially developed by the 
courts and has been followed by successive governments and 
the Canadian Parliament. 
The adoption of a republic in Canada would require a re-
evaluation of the relationship between the different peoples of 
the country.  To some degree, the establishment of Canada was 
founded on a series of treaties between the Crown and the Na-
tive American peoples.  The obligations under these treaties 
have been assumed by the Canadian authorities, but in such a 
way that the Crown remains symbolically central to the rela-
tionship.40 The Europeans and the natives did not have such a 
relationship, as the Crown did not purport to represent a popu-
lation as such — though the relationship could be perceived as 
  
 33. See Brian Slattery, The Independence of Canada, 5 SUP. CT. L. REV. 
369, 373, 382 (1983) (Can.). 
 34. Graham Interview, supra note 10; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; The Queen v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; The 
Queen v. Sparrow, [1990] 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385; Guerin v. The Queen, [1985] 13 
D.L.R. (4th) 321, Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 395. 
 35. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. at 395. 
 36. Guerin, 13 D.L.R. (4th) at 334. 
 37. Id. at 334 (Dickson, J.). 
 38. Id. at 357–58, 361 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 39. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
 40. One rather unusual aspect of this is the existence, since 1711, of Her 
Majesty’s Chapel of the Mohawk, Brantford, Ontario.  See DAVID BALDWIN, 
THE CHAPEL ROYAL: ANCIENT AND MODERN 56–62 (1990).   
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being between the State and the natives — provided that there 
was an agreement as to the nature of the State (i.e., the mean-
ing of the Crown). 
The general rules of fiduciary obligations have also been de-
veloped in the United States of America,41 though the practical 
implications of these rules for the native peoples may be lim-
ited.42  The relationship between the United States of America 
and the North American tribes within its boundaries followed a 
similar path to that seen in Canada.43  Yet Canada alone se-
cured, at least in theory, Indian rights generally, not only those 
of title to land.44  They did so with the Royal Proclamation, 
which, like the Treaty of Waitangi, has been analogized to the 
Magna Carta.45   
B. Australia  
In contrast to Canada, the principles of Crown guardianship 
of native peoples had received little judicial attention in Austra-
lia until Mabo v. Queensland (No 2).46  Though it had been said 
in an earlier case that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth 
of Australia may come under a fiduciary duty,47 the judgements 
in Mabo showed a more marked inclination to recognize a fidu-
ciary obligation in cases where there was actual or threatened 
interference with native title rights.48  
  
 41. See Camilla Hughes, The Fiduciary Obligations of the Crown to Abo-
rigines: Lessons from the United States and Canada, 16 U. NEW SOUTH WALES 
L. J. 70, 87 (1993).  These duties can be traced back to 1831, id. at 70–71, 
though the treatment of American Indians by the government until the early 
years of the twentieth century was frequently brutal, and sometimes at odd 
with judicial decisions. 
 42. See Searles, supra note 12, at 210–11. 
 43. See Hughes, supra note 41, at 87–94. 
 44. See Calder v. Attorney-General, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 395. 
 45. Richard Boivin, The Coté Decision: Laying to Rest the Royal Proclama-
tion, 1 CAN. NATIVE L. REP. 1, 1 (1995).  Cf.  PAUL MCHUGH , THE MAORI MAGNA 
CARTA: NEW ZEALAND LAW AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1991). 
 46. Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 42–43, 205 (Austl.). 
 47. N. Land Council v. Commonwealth [No. 2] 61 A.L.J.R. 616, 620 (1987) 
(Austl.). 
 48. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 42–43, 205.  Acquisition of legal title over Austra-
lia was based on settlement, not conquest, with the continent being regarded 
legally a terra nullius, or subject to no legal sovereign.  This was legally true 
of New Zealand also, but for political and moral reasons this country was 
treated differently.   
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Aboriginal relations, however, have played a lesser part in 
the Australian republican debate than they have in the political 
debate in Canada or New Zealand, largely because the Austra-
lian aboriginal population generally lacked treaties with the 
Crown.49 Suggestions in recent years for such a treaty raised an 
interesting question about the extent to which Australia could 
(or would wish to) replicate the situations that have existed in 
Canada for 200 years and in New Zealand for over 150 years.50  
Ironically, some commentators have suggested that “aborigi-
nality” should replace the Crown in the Australian national 
identity,51 thereby in some respects reversing the relationship of 
the settlers and the aboriginal people.  Precisely what is meant 
by “aboriginality” is not clear, however.  Although the Crown 
assumed in Australia, as it did in all colonies, the  role of protec-
tor of the native peoples, the protection was limited because of 
the absence of written undertakings.   
III. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
The situation in New Zealand is much closer to that in Can-
ada than in Australia.  In both New Zealand and Canada, the 
Crown assumed a fiduciary role through treaty and its conduct 
with respect to the native peoples.  The Crown has perpetual 
responsibilities to native peoples in both countries.  In New Zea-
land, however, one treaty has paramount significance, in part 
simply because it was the only treaty made with the indigenous 
inhabitants of the islands. 52 
  
 49. See Wendy Brady, Republicanism: An Aboriginal View, in THE 
REPUBLICANISM DEBATE  145, 146–47 (Wayne  Hudson & David Carter eds., 
1993); see also, generally, Paul Behrendt, Aboriginal Sovereignty, in VOICES OF 
ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE  398 (Irene Moores ed., 1995). 
 50. Cox, supra note 8, at 86.  See also Mark Brabazon, Mabo, The Constitu-
tion and The Republic, 11 AUSTL. BAR REV. 31, 36–38 (1994); James Cockayne, 
More Than Sorry: Constructing a Legal Architecture for Practical Reconcilia-
tion, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 590 (2001); Andrew Lokan, From Recognition to 
Reconciliation: The Functions of Aboriginal Rights Law, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 
65, 112 (1999). 
 51. John Morton, Aboriginality, Mabo and the Republic: Indigenising Aus-
tralia, in IN THE AGE OF MABO: HISTORY, ABORIGINES AND AUSTRALIA 117, 119–
123 (Bain Attwood ed., 1996). 
 52. William Renwick, A Variation of a Theme, in SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS : THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 
199, 208 (William Renwick ed., 1991). 
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Orthodox theory holds that the Treaty of Waitangi (“Treaty”) 
has a socio-political, not legal, force, as it was not a treaty rec-
ognized under international law.53  It therefore has an effect 
only so far as a legal recognition has been specifically accorded 
to it.54  However, at some point either the courts or New Zea-
land Parliament may have to give the Treaty legal recognition 
as part of the constitution of New Zealand.55  In any event the 
Treaty, as a constitutional principle, has become entrenched, if 
only because it is generally regarded by the Maori as a sort of 
“holy writ.”56  Government agencies therefore apply the Treaty, 
wherever possible, as if it were legally binding upon them.57 In 
this respect, the growth in what has been called the “myth” of 
Crown–Maori partnership has been particularly important.58 
This section looks at the events that led to the assumption of 
British authority in New Zealand, the process by which this 
assumption was achieved, the legal basis for this assumption, 
and the legitimacy derived from the Treaty. 
A. Assumption of Sovereignty 
Scholars disagree as to the specific date of assumption of Brit-
ish sovereignty over New Zealand.59  The actual means of ob-
  
 53. See Anthony P. Molloy, The Non-Treaty of Waitangi, N.Z.  L.J. 193, 193 
(1971).  For a contrary view, based on the changing precepts of modern inter-
national law, see K. Bosselmann, Two Cultures Will Become One Only on 
Equal Terms, N. Z. HERALD , Mar. 1, 1999, at A13.  However, if the Treaty was 
not a treaty in 1840, it is difficult to see how it could be one now.  It would be 
preferable to see its importance in domestic constitutional terms.  See E.T.J. 
Durie, The Treaty in Maori History, in SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: 
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 156, 162–64 (William 
Renwick ed., 1991). 
 54. See generally W. Attrill, Aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi in the Law 
and Constitution of New Zealand (1989) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard 
University) (on file with author). 
 55. John Fogarty, Book Review, N.Z. L.J. 212 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP A. 
JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND (1993)). 
 56. Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Guy Chapman, The Treaty of Waitangi — Fertile Ground for Judi-
cial (and Academic) Myth-making, N.Z. L.J. 228 (1991). Cf. Paul McHugh, 
Constitutional Myths and the Treaty of Waitangi, N.Z. L.J. 316, 317–18 (1991); 
Joe Williams, Chapman is Wrong, N.Z. L.J. 373 (1991). 
 59. David V. Williams, The Use of Law in the Process of Colonialization 
67ff (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam) (on file 
with author).  There have been many works covering the events both prior to 
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taining sovereignty is also disputed.  William Swainson, the 
first New Zealand Attorney-General, thought that sovereignty 
was partly established by cession, and that neither conquest nor 
usurpation had occurred.60  The Colonial Office, in rejecting 
Swainson’s view, held that the New South Wales Charter of 
November 16, 1840, was the legal basis of sovereignty.61  
Though the assumption of sovereignty is disputed, the legal 
foundation of New Zealand as a separate colony can be ascer-
tained with some certainty.62 
Captain James Cook, of the British Royal Navy, took posses-
sion of the North Island on November 15, 1769, and the South 
Island on January 16, 1770.63  New Zealand constituted a part 
of the Colony of New South Wales by an Order in Council in 
1786 and the first Governor’s Commission for that colony.64  
  
and immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.  For an overview 
of the subsequent constitutional implications, see S.L. Cheyne, Search for a 
Constitution (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Otago) (on file 
with author); David V. Williams, The Annexation of New Zealand to New 
South Wales in 1840: What of the Treaty of Waitangi?, 2 AUSTL. J. L. & SOC. 41 
(1985); David V. Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zealand, 
13 N.Z.U. L. REV. 54 (1988). 
 60. Whether the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament was le-
gally and/or politically grounded in the Treaty of Waitangi has been answered 
in the affirmative by Paul McHugh.  See Paul McHugh, Constitutional Theory 
and Maori Claims, in WAITANGI : MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI 25, 42, 47 (Sir Hugh Kawharu ed., 1989).  See also Sian 
Elias, The Treaty of Waitangi and Separation of Powers in New Zealand, in 
COURTS AND POLICY: CHECKING THE BALANCE 206, 222–224 (B.D. Gray & R.B. 
McClintock eds., 1995). 
 61. Charter for erecting the Colony of New Zealand, and for Creating and 
Establishing a Legislative Council and an Executive Council (Nov. 16, 1840), 
reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS , 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 
1835–42, at 153–155 (Irish University Press Series 1970) [hereinafter Charter 
of Dec. 9, 1840]. 
 62. In modern popular mythology, the Treaty of Waitangi is taken to be the 
foundation of New Zealand.  The legal significance of February 6, 1840 is, 
however, rather less according to the general and settled imperial law of the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Wi Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 N.Z. 
Jurist Reports (New Series) 72.  Cf.  The Queen v. Symonds [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 
387. 
 63. British courts have held that an unequivocal assertion of sovereignty 
by the Crown must be accepted by a domestic court, even where the claim 
would not be recognised under international law.  See Sobhuza II v. Miller 
[1926] A.C. 518, 524–25. 
 64. J. L. ROBSON, NEW ZEALAND : THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND 
CONSTITUTION 2 (1954).  The Commission issued instructions April 25, 1787 to 
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However, this is a rather strained interpretation of the actual 
authority enjoyed by the government in Sydney.65   
The Government and General Order Proclamation issued in 
1813 by Lachlan Macquarie, Governor of New South Wales, de-
clared that the aboriginal natives of New Zealand were “under 
the protection of His Majesty and entitled to all good offices of 
his subjects.”66  However, the jurisdiction of New South Wales 
over the islands of New Zealand was expressly denied by an 
imperial statute, the Murder Abroad Act of 1817.67  Subsequent 
enactments repeated that New Zealand was “not subject to his 
Majesty.”68  Since 1823, however, the courts of New South 
Wales were permitted to try cases for offences committed in 
New Zealand by British subjects.69  Extra-territorial judicial 
processes were at this time common, particularly where British 
trade was conducted in countries with “non-Christian or bar-
baric laws,” or with no laws at all.70  Thus, it is likely that ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction was intended, rather than any claim 
to sovereignty. 
Circumstances eventually required greater official British in-
volvement in New Zealand.  In 1831, thirteen chiefs from 
Kerikeri petitioned King William IV for protection against the 
  
Captain Arthur Phillip, Royal Navy, appointing him “Captain General and 
Governor in Chief of Our Territory called New South Wales . . . .”  Governor 
Phillip’s Instructions, Apr. 25, 1787, H.R.A., Ser. I, vol. 1, at p. 1, available at 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/places/transcripts/nsw/nsw_pdf/nsw2_doc_17
87.pdf.  The commission, which was amplified on April 2, 1787, was publicly 
read at Sydney Cove on January 26, 1788.  See ALEX C. CASTLES, AN 
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 24 (1982). 
 65. ROBSON, supra note 64.  See also A.H. MCLINTOCK, CROWN COLONY 
GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 9 (1958).  New Zealand was generally regarded 
as being included in the territory of the Colony of New South Wales in early 
years of the development of that colony.  Id. 
 66. ROBERT MCNAB, 1 HISTORICAL RECORDS OF NEW ZEALAND 317 (1908). 
 67. An Act for the More Effectual Punishment of Murders and Manslaugh-
ters Committed in Places not within His Majesty’s Dominions, 57 Geo. III, c. 
53 (1817) (U.K.). 
 68. Australian Courts Act, 1828, 9 Geo. IV, c. 83 (U.K.). 
 69. An Act for the Better Administration of Justice in New South Wales 
and Van Diemen’s Land, 1823, 4 Geo. IV, c. 96 (U.K.). 
 70. Such a jurisdiction survived in the Trucial States, now the United Arab 
Emirates, until 1971.  See Exchange of Notes Concerning the Termination of 
Special Treaty Relations between the United Kingdom and the Trucial States, 
1971 U.K.T.S. No. 34, at 3 (Cmnd. 4941). 
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French.71  As a result of this petition, and to curb the conduct of 
visiting ships’ crews and round up runaway convicts, James 
Busby was appointed British Resident in Waitangi in 1833, 
with the local rank of vice-consul.72  No magisterial powers were 
ever conferred upon him; imperial legislation seeking to in-
crease his powers was contemplated but never passed.73   
Busby encouraged the Declaration of Independence by thirty-
five northern chiefs in 1835, in an attempt to thwart the move 
by Charles de Thierry, the self-styled “Sovereign Chief of New 
Zealand and King of Nuku Hiva,” to set up his own govern-
ment.74 The Declaration of Independence of the United Tribes of 
Aotearoa in 1835 may have been “politically unsustainable, 
practically unworkable, and culturally inconceivable.”75  None-
theless, for those tribes who signed, the Declaration meant that 
henceforth the British king was “honour-bound to recognise and 
protect their independence.”76 This step was followed by the 
Treaty of Waitangi, inspired as much by internal Colonial Office 
politics as by a genuine regard for native rights.77  
In 1838, a House of Lords committee favored the extension of 
British possession over New Zealand, though it did not ex-
pressly advocate it.78  The Colonial Office, however, decided to 
annex New Zealand to New South Wales.79  On June 15, 1839, 
letters patent were signed, which enlarged the jurisdiction of 
the Governor of New South Wales by amending his commission 
  
 71. MCLINTOCK, supra note 65, at 18. 
 72. Id. at 22. 
 73. See id. at 21 n.4, 25. 
 74. See id. at 24; see also J.D. RAESIDE , SOVEREIGN CHIEF, A BIOGRAPHY OF 
BARON DE THIERRY 113, 118–19 (1977). 
 75. Jane Kelsey, Restructuring the Nation: The Decline of the Colonial 
Nation-State and Competing Nationalisms in Aotearoa/New Zealand, in 
NATIONALISM, RACISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 177, 178–179 (Peter Fitzpatrick 
ed., 1995).  The Declaration was “laughed at” in many circles.  See Copy of a 
Despatch from Governor Sir R. Bourke . . . to Lord Glenelg (Sept. 9, 1837), 
reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS , 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 
1835–42, at 24 (Irish University Press Series 1970). 
 76. Kelsey, supra note 75, at 179; Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 77. Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 78. See Letter from Standish Motte, Esq., to the Marquis of Normanby 
(Mar. 4, 1839), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW 
ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 68–69 (Irish University Press Series 1970).  See also 
PETER ADAMS, FATAL NECESSITY 134–171 (1977). 
 79. See ADAMS, supra note 78, at 134–171. 
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to include the New Zealand islands.80  On January 14, 1840, Sir 
George Gipps, Governor of New South Wales, swore in Captain 
William Hobson of the British Royal Navy, as his lieutenant-
governor and consul, and signed proclamations relating to title 
to the land in New Zealand.81  These were published in Sydney 
on January 19, 1840, and in New Zealand January 30, 1840.82 
Hobson was instructed to take possession of the country only 
with the consent of the Maori chiefs.83  The Treaty of Waitangi 
was the immediate instrument by which this was to be 
achieved.84  The Treaty was initially signed on February 6, 
1840, although the process of signing copies was not completed 
until September 3, 1840.85  After the chiefs signed, local 
proclamations of British sovereignty were issued.  However, no 
formal proclamation of sovereignty by the Imperial Government 
over the northern districts was ever issued.  In the central 
North Island there was substantial non-adherence to the Treaty 
by Maori leaders who were well aware of the implications of 
signing away their independence.86  
  
 80. Proclamation By His Excellency Sir George Gipps, Kni ght, Captain-
General and Governor-in-Chief (Feb. 9, 1840), reprinted in BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 123 (Irish 
University Press Series 1970). 
 81. Id. at 123–25. 
 82. Id. 
 83. From the Marquis of Normanby to Captain Hobson, Royal Navy (Aug.  
14, 1839), reprinted in BRITISH PUBLIC PAPERS , 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 
1835–42, at 85–90 (Irish University Press Series 1970) [hereinafter Marquis 
of Normanby to Hobson, Aug. 14, 1839]. 
 84. See id. at 86–87; MCLINTOCK, supra note 65, at 61–62, 146. 
 85. T. LINDSAY BUICK, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI OR HOW NEW ZEALAND 
BECAME A BRITISH COLONY 203–13 (1914).  See also CLAUDIA ORANGE , THE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI 84–6 (1987); J. RUTHERFORD, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
AND THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY IN NEW ZEALAND  20, 63 (1949). 
 86. NZHistory.net.nz, Manukau-Kawhia Treaty Copy, at 
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/gallery/treaty-sigs/manukau.htm (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2002).  There were “very serious doubts whether the Treaty of Wai-
tangi, made with naked savages by a Consul invested with no plenipotentiary 
powers, without ratification by the Crown, could be treated by lawyers as 
anything but a praiseworthy device for amusing and pacifying savages for the 
moment.”  The Effect of the Treaty of Waitangi on Subsequent Legislation, 10 
N.Z. L.J. 13, 15 (1934) (quoting Letter from Joseph Soames to Lord Stanley, 
Minister for the Colonies (Jan. 24, 1843) (promoting the Company’s claim to 
twenty million acres of New Zealand)).   
The New Zealand Company was not disinterested in this matter, and it was 
incorrect that Hobson was merely a consul without plenipotentiary power — 
 
File: Cox Base  Macro  final.doc Created on: 10/14/2002 7:35 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:24 PM 
2002] TREATY OF WAITANGI 137 
As a result of reports that the New Zealand Company settlers 
in Wellington (then Port Nicholson) had issued their own con-
stitution and set up a government,87 on May 21, 1840, Hobson 
issued two proclamations of full sovereignty over all of New 
Zealand, which were published in The London Gazette on Octo-
ber 2, 1840.88  The first proclamation was in respect to the 
North Island, and was based on cession by virtue of the Treaty 
of Waitangi.89  The second related to the South Island (then 
Middle Island) and Stewart Island.90   
On October 15, 1840, Hobson sent a despatch to London 
which collated all the copies of the Treaty,91 and this despatch 
was approved March 30, 1841.92  In it, Hobson indicated that 
the second proclamation of May 21, 1840 relied on the right of 
discovery, rather than on the Treaty.93  Hobson was thus acting 
  
he had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor and instructed to make a treaty 
with the natives.  See Marquis of Normanby to Hobson, Aug. 14, 1839, supra 
note 83.  Nor was ratification by the Crown necessary.  But the essence of the 
argument remained as to the Treaty of Waitangi’s status in international law. 
 87. Lieut.-Governor Hobson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (May 
25, 1840), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW 
ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 138–39 (Irish University Press Series 1970) [hereinafter 
Hobson Letter of May 25, 1840]. 
 88. Proclamation In the Name of Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, by William Hobson, Esq. (May 
21, 1840) [“The Northern Island”], reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
PAPERS , 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 140 (Irish University Press 
Series 1970) [hereinafter Northern Island Proclamation of 1840]; Proclama-
tion In the Name of Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, by William Hobson, Esquire (May 21, 1840) [“The 
Southern Islands of New Zealand”], reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
PAPERS , 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 141 (Irish University Press 
Series 1970) [hereinafter Southern Islands Proclamation of 1840]. 
 89. See Hobson Letter of May 25, 1840, supra note 86; Northern Island 
Proclamation of 1840, supra note 87.  But see Carter, supra note 6 (arguing 
that the Treaty was a legally valid treaty of cession); Sir Kenneth Keith, In-
ternational Law and New Zealand Municipal Law, in AG DAVIS ESSAYS IN 
LAW 130–48 (J.F. Northey ed., 1965) (same).   
 90. Southern Islands Proclamation of 1840, supra note 88. 
 91. Copy of a Despatch from Governor Hobson to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, (Oct. 15, 1840), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3  
COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 220 (Irish University Press Series 
1970). 
 92. Copy of a Despatch from Lord John Russell to Governor Hobson (March 
30, 1831), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW 
ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 234 (Irish University Press Series 1970). 
 93. Hobson Letter of May 25, 1840, supra note 87. 
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in conformity with his instructions to extend British sover-
eignty over the South Island “by treaty, if that be possible, or if 
not, then in the assertion, on the ground of discovery, of Her 
Majesty's sovereign rights over the island.”94  
In the meantime, Major Bunbury proclaimed sovereignty by 
cession over the South Island on June 17, 1840.  The proclama-
tions of May 21 were effective in showing that New Zealand was 
a colony by act of State.95  An act of State must be accepted as 
legally effective,96 and no special formality is required for an-
nexation.97 
Meanwhile, the government of New South Wales purported to 
annex New Zealand through an act that came into force as of 
June 16, 1840;98 yet this was done in ignorance of the British 
imperial plans.99  New Zealand remained a dependency of New 
South Wales until letters patent in the form of a Royal Charter 
were signed on November 16, 1840.100  The letters patent and a 
Governor’s commission101 were published in the London Gazette 
on November 24, 1840, and proclaimed in New Zealand on May 
  
 94. Captain William Hobson to the Under Secretary of the Colonial De-
partment (August 15, 1839), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 
COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 90–92 (Irish University Press Series 
1970); Marquis of Normanby to Captain Hobson (August 15, 1839); reprinted 
in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND 1835–42, at 92–
93 (Irish University Press 1970). 
 95. Robson argues that it was a colony by occupation, but Foden (in the 
minority viewpoint), argues that it was through settlement.  Compare 
ROBSON, supra note 64, at 4–5, with N.A. FODEN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE FIRST DECADE  38 (1938).  In Foden’s 
view, the letters patent of June 15, 1839 are the fons et origo of British sover-
eignty.  He eliminates the humanitarianism and idealism prevalent in earlier 
interpretations of the events of 1839–40.  Cf. RUTHERFORD, supra note 85. 
 96. Salaman v. Secretary of State in Council of India, 1906 K.B. 613 (Eng. 
C.A.).   
 97. In re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211, 239–41 (P.C. 1918). 
 98. An Act to Annex to Her Majesty’s Dominions, in the Islands of New 
Zealand, to the Government of New South Wales, 3 Vict. 28 (Austl.); David V. 
Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zealand, 13 N.Z.U. L. REV. 
54, 56 (1988). 
 99. Charter of Dec. 9, 1840, supra note 61. 
 100. Copy of Letters Patent Appointing William Hobson, Esq. Captain in 
the Royal Navy Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and Over the Colony of 
New Zealand (Nov. 24, 1840), reprinted in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS , 3 
COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–42, at 153–155 (Irish University Press Series 
1970). 
 101. Id.  
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3, 1841.102  The Royal Instructions to the Governor were issued 
December 5, 1840.103  The Charter was based solely on the au-
thority of the New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land Act of 
1840, passed August 7, 1840, by which separate colonies were to 
be established in the territories of the Colony New South Wales 
and Van Diemen’s Land.104  
The assumption of British rule over New Zealand was in 
some way inevitable, but it came at a time when modern no-
tions of international law were evolving.  It was clear that the 
Crown was acting, at least partly, for the good of the Maori.  In 
this regard, the Crown assumed an obligation towards the na-
tive peoples that was to outlast its imperial authority and be-
come a legacy for post-colonial governments. 
B. The Legal Basis for the Assumption of Sovereignty 
According to the constitutional theory, which had evolved 
since the establishment in the seventeenth century of the first 
British Empire,105 colonies in the mid-nineteenth century were 
either settled colonies, conquered colonies, or ceded colonies.106  
The basis of the distinction was the stage of civilization consid-
ered to have existed in the territory at the time of acquisition.  
If there was no population or no form of government considered 
civilized and recognized in international law, possession was 
obtained by settlement.107  If there was an organized society to 
  
 102. PETER  ADAMS, FATAL NECESSITY 162 (1977). 
 103. Instructions to . . . William Hobson, Esq. our Governor and Com-
mander-in-Chief in and Over Our Colony of New Zealand (Dec. 5, 1840), re-
printed in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 3 COLONIES, NEW ZEALAND, 1835–
42, at 156–64 (Irish University Press Series 1970). 
 104. New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land Act, 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 62 
(Eng.).  This statute of course presupposed that New Zealand was by 1840 a 
part of the Colony of New South Wales, a fact which was sufficiently clear 
after June 15, 1839.  Van Diemen’s Land (renamed Tasmania in 1856) like-
wise became a colony independent of New South Wales, by letters patent June 
14, 1825. 
 105. See A. BERRIEDALE  KEITH , CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
BRITISH EMPIRE , at B2 (1930).   
 106. Phillips v. Eyre, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1, 10–11 (1870) (Eng.); Lyons (Mayor of) v. 
East India Co., 12 Eng. Rep. 782 (P.C. 1836); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE , 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND  104 (1978). 
 107. R. Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
20–23 (1963). 
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which international personality was attributable, acquisition 
was accomplished by cession or conquest.108   
The original, relatively clear distinction, between the de-
serted and uninhabited territories, which could be settled, and 
those that were inhabited, which could not be settled, was 
eroded after the American Revolution.  It became accepted that 
colonies occupied by a tribal society could be “settled.”  New 
Zealand has been cited as the example par excellence of this 
trend towards a legal fiction of a terra nullius .109  If this were so, 
then the Treaty of Waitangi could not have been a treaty of ces-
sion, as the later nineteenth century orthodox theory main-
tained.110  The Treaty of Waitangi had a socio-political, not legal 
force, as it was not a treaty recognized by international law.111  
The authority actually exercised by the Crown in New Zea-
land always exceeded that of a protectorate,112 and, from the 
beginning, New Zealand was administered as a Crown colony.113  
New Zealand was held to be a settled colony — though not 
without difficulty.114  From the contemporary British perspec-
  
 108. Lyons (Mayor of) v. East India Co., 12 Eng. Rep. 782 (P.C. 1836); 
Freeman v. Fairlie, 18 Eng. Rep. 117 (P.C. 1828); BLACKSTONE, supra note 
105, at 104. 
 109. A land without a settled population, which therefore could have no 
laws nor legal rights (as of ownership) except that imposed upon the acquisi-
tion of sovereignty; Paul McHugh, Aboriginal Rights of the New Zealand 
Maori at Common Law 137–142 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Cambridge) (on file with author). 
 110. Wi Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 N.Z. Jurist Reports 
(New Series) 72.   
 111. Molloy, supra note 53, at 195; Wi Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington 
[1877] 3 N.Z. Jurist Reports (New Series) 72.  Cf.   The Queen v. Symonds 
[1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387. 
 112. Where, for example, the relations of imperial power and local popula-
tion were regulated by specific treaty arrangements.  In practice, the extent to 
which such countries were treated differently from colonies depended upon 
the degree of sophistication of the indigenous inhabitants’ civilization.  
RUPERT EMERSON , FROM EMPIRE TO NATION : THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF 
ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES (1960). 
 113. Cheyne, supra note 59.  See also English Laws Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. 
No. 2 (N.Z.); Imperial Laws Application Act, 1988, § 5, sched. 2 (N.Z.). 
 114. See David V. Williams, The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zea-
land, 13 N.Z.U. L. REV. 54 (1998); REPORT OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL ON THE 
PROJECT OF A BILL FOR THE BETTER GOVERNMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES, 
1849; The Queen v. Symonds [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387.  See also English Laws 
Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. No. 2 (N.Z.); Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, § 5, 
sched. 2 (N.Z.). 
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tive, the Treaty of Waitangi was a treaty of cession, which al-
lowed for the settlement and purchase of land.115  However, be-
cause the chiefs had little formal law, and because of the direct 
proclamation of sovereignty over the South Islands, New Zea-
land was treated thereafter as a settled colony.116  That said, 
even if the Maori were not able to make binding international 
treaties, the Treaty of Waitangi was not a mere nullity.  The 
capacity to make international treaties was distinct from the 
existence of an established system of laws or legal personality.  
Almost invariably in British imperial practice, the acquisition of 
territories was by cession, accompanied by treaties, in which 
the inhabitants’ entitlement to the continued occupation of the 
territory was declared.117  This practice implied, by definition, 
that the territorial sovereignty and property rights of the in-
habitants were recognized.118  
There can also be little doubt that the negotiation of the 
Treaty of Waitangi presupposed the legal and political capacity 
of the chiefs of New Zealand to make some form of internation-
ally valid agreement.119  Moreover, there is evidence that in the 
decade prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi the 
British Government conducted itself on the basis that relations 
with the Maori tribes were governed by the rules of interna-
tional law,120 and therefore bound, at least morally, by the 
  
 115. IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 9 (F.M. Brookfield 
ed., 1992). 
 116. KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 196 (1989). 
 117. Frederika Hackhsaw, Nineteenth Century Notions of Aboriginal Title, 
in WAITANGI: MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 92, 
97 (I.H. Kawharu ed., 1989).  See SIR MARK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND 
GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION (1969); 
Elizabeth Evatt, The Acquisition of Territory in Australia and New Zealand, 
in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 16, 16–45 (C.H.  Alex-
androwicz ed., 1970). 
 118. See McHugh, supra note 58, at 317–19 (discussing the nineteenth cen-
tury theory and practice). 
 119. Examples of where treaties with native peoples were regarded as bind-
ing in international law include those made with the Cherokee on September 
20, 1730.  See 2 J. ALMON, A COLLECTION OF ALL THE TREATIES OF PEACE, ETC. 
13 (1772). 
 120. See 1 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A SELECTION OF 
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE V IEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM UPON MATTERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (Herbert Arthur Smith 
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terms of a treaty of cession.  The fact that doctrinal develop-
ments in international law subsequently denied the treaty-
making capacity to what were described as “Native chiefs and 
Peoples”121 is immaterial.   
If the Treaty of Waitangi was a valid international treaty, its 
very execution served to extinguish the separate legal identity 
of the sovereign chiefs and brought questions of its implementa-
tion to the plane of domestic law.122  New Zealand would then be 
regarded as a ceded territory, and its pre-existing laws subject 
to abolition or amendment by the Crown.123  If it was not a valid 
international treaty, its application remained a matter of do-
mestic law.124  In both cases it depended upon the good faith of 
the Crown that the provisions of the Treaty were upheld.  This 
meant that the principal focus was on domestic law, which was 
perhaps preferable to attempting to resolve essentially internal 
problems on the international plane.  In the decade prior to the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi, the British Government 
conducted itself on the basis that relations with the Maori 
tribes were governed by the rules of international law, at least 
with respect to the North Island,125 and therefore bound, at 
least morally, by the terms of a treaty of cession.   
C. Legitimacy Derived from the Treaty of Waitangi 
The Crown acquired legal authority over New Zealand by dis-
covery and settlement, as well as by cession.126  But this acqui-
sition of authority was intended by the imperial government to 
be with the consent of the Maori chiefs, and the chiefs generally 
accepted it on that basis.127  This acquisition was in conformity 
  
ed., 1932) [hereinafter THE LAW OF NATIONS]; IAN BROWNLIE, Q.C., TREATIES 
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 8 (F.M.  Brookfield ed., 1992). 
 121. 1 LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES, 52–54 (1961). 
 122. See Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] 
N.Z.L.R. 590, 596–597, A.C. 308, 324 (P.C. 1941) (holding that the Treaty was 
not enforceable in domestic law).   
 123. Whether pre-existing indigenous legal rights automatically survived 
settlement or cession, or were dependent upon Crown recognition was only 
settled comparatively recently in favour of the continuing legality of native 
rights.  KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 196 (1989).   
 124. See Te Heuheu Tukino , [1941] N.Z.L.R. at 596–597, A.C. at 324. 
 125. See sources cited supra note 120. 
 126. Evatt, supra note 117, at 36–39. 
 127. McHugh, supra note 60, at 47. 
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with prior colonial practice128 and consistent with the practice of 
the previous several decades.129  Unfortunately for the Maori, 
after 1840 the practice of the colonial government, to whom the 
imperial authorities increasingly sought to transfer responsibil-
ity, was one of widespread disregard for the spirit, if not the 
terms, of the Treaty.130   
The British side thought that the chiefs were making a mean-
ingful recognition of the Queen and the concept of national sov-
ereignty in return for the recognition of their rights of prop-
erty.131  In contrast, David Williams has argued that the Maori 
text connoted a covenant partnership between the Crown and 
Maori, rather than an absolute cession of sovereignty;132 but 
this interpretation may be strained.133  It is likely that the 
chiefs did not anticipate that the Treaty would have such far -
reaching consequences for them.  Claims of legitimacy founded 
in a completely different value system can be so unclear as to be 
nearly impossible to distinguish.134 After the treaty the extent of 
the chiefs’ loss became apparent, but it was too late. 
In the absence of a voluntary cession of full sovereignty, the 
legitimacy of colonial rule could only be validated over time 
through the habit of obedience135 or legal sovereignty.136  This 
  
 128. MARK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD 
TERRITORIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION (1969). 
 129. Interview with Georgina Te Heuheu, former Associate Minister in 
Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, in Auckland, N.Z. (Dec. 7, 1999) 
(on file with author). 
 130. F.M. BROOKFIELD , WAITANGI AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: REVOLUTION , LAW 
AND LEGITIMATION (1999) (amounting to what Brookfield calls a revolutionary 
seizure of power). 
 131. Catherine Tizard, Address at The Wellington Historical and Early 
Settlers’ Association 1995 Lecture on Colonial Chiefs 1840–1889 (March 30, 
1995), at http://www.gov_gen.govt.nz/speeches/tizard/1995-03-30.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Tizard Address]. 
 132. David V. Williams, The Constitutional Status of the Treaty of Waitangi: 
An Historical Perspective, 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 9, 16–18 (1990). 
 133. The contra proferetem principle leads to the conclusion that the Maori 
version is definitive.   See id. 
 134. Tizard Address, supra note 131. 
 135. F.M. Brookfield, The New Zealand Constitution the Search for Legiti-
macy, in WAITANGI : MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI 1, 1 (Hugh Kawharu ed., 1989). 
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approach is based upon European legal concepts, something 
that has been criticized by some Maori academics.137  However, 
“legitimation by effectiveness and durability of even a revolu-
tionary assumption of power is a well understood principle of 
law,”138 even amongst the early Maori.139  Whether or not it had 
been intended by the signatories, it is now widely assumed that 
Maori have, under the first article, accepted the sovereignty of 
the Crown,140 and have therefore accepted the legitimacy of the 
present government and legal system.141  Indeed, most Maori 
leaders accept this legitimacy and concentrate on the Crown’s 
failure to keep its obligations to protect property rights under 
the Treaty.142  It might be said that the government has always 
viewed the Treaty as mainly a source of its own authority,143 
whereas in the common Maori view, the Crown's protection of 
Maori property144 was more important than the placement of 
  
 136. Paul McHugh, Constitutional Theory and Maori Claims, in WAITANGI: 
MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (Hugh Kawharu 
ed., 1989). 
 137. See Annie L. Mikaere, Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 97, 98 (1990) (book review). 
 138. R.W.M. Dias, Legal Politics: Norms behind the Grundnorm, 26 Cam-
bridge L.J.  233, 237–38 (1968). 
 139. See MOANA JACKSON, THE MAORI AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE: TE WHAIPAANGA HOU (Part 2) 35–44 (1988) [hereinafter 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM]; Moana Jackson, Maori Law, Pakeha Law and the 
Treaty of Waitangi, in MANA TIRITI: THE ART OF PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP 15–
16 (Ramari Young ed., 1991) [hereinafter PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP]. 
 140. See WAITANGI TRIBUNAL , WAI 350, MAORI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
REPORT app. 6.1  (1993), available at 
http://www.wai8155s1.verdi.2day.com/reports/generic/wai350/app06/app0601.
asp; Te Heuheu, Interview, supra note 129.  For general discussions of percep-
tions of Maori sovereignty, see generally HINEANI MELBOURNE , MAORI 
SOVEREIGNTY : THE MAORI PERSPECTIVE (1995); CAROL ARCHIE, MAORI 
SOVEREIGNTY : THE PAKEHA PERSPECTIVE (1995).  
 141. Indeed, it has been said that it is unrealistic to maintain any contrary 
argument.  Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 142. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 56, 57–59.  There are some who, whilst decry-
ing alleged Crown breaches of the Treaty, deny that the Treaty conveyed any-
thing more than permission for European settlement — a case of “having their 
cake and eating it too.”  Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 143. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840, Eng.-Maori, art. I, 89 Consol. T.S. 
473, 475, available at http://www.govt.nz/aboutnz/treaty.php3. 
 144. Id. art. III. 
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authority.145  This pragmatic position has proved most effective 
and has led to the successful conclusion of numerous claims for 
compensation for past wrongs.   
The Treaty at least partially justifies or legitimates the 
Crown and Parliament’s claims to power, though, in Jackson’s 
view, only with respect to Pakeha .146  However, such a resolu-
tion presupposes that the original assumption of sovereignty 
was in some way illegal, a proposition itself open to argu-
ment.147   
It becomes clear that traditional views of the Treaty must be 
reassessed, and that the concept (or “myth” as Guy Chapman 
called it148) of the Treaty as a living document is symbolically 
important.  A republican constitution would allow a fresh start, 
though at a greater potential risk, due to the need to re-
evaluate the nature of the relationship between the Maori and 
the government.  But not all have accepted that the Treaty of 
Waitangi is a substantial enough basis upon which to build a 
constitution.149   
The Treaty occupies an uncertain place in the New Zealand 
constitution.150 No Maori law was recognized by the colonial le-
gal system151 — indeed there was no Maori law as the term is 
now generally understood.152  The New Zealand Parliament has 
never doubted that they have full authority irrespective of the 
Treaty.153  There have been some signs that this orthodoxy may 
be challenged,154 but it is difficult to see how this could be 
  
 145. See Haare Williams, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, in HE KORERO MO WAITANGI 
1984 (Arapera Bank et al. eds., 1985). 
 146. PROTEST AND PARTNERSHIP , supra note 139, at 19. 
 147. F.M. Brookfield, Parliament, the Treaty, and Freedom, in ESSAYS ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 43–46 (Philip Joseph ed., 1995). 
 148. Chapman, supra note 57. 
 149. See, e.g., Peperell, supra note 2 (quoting Simon Upton, Member of Par-
liament, Address before the Parliament of New Zealand, Dec. 12, 2000). 
 150. For the general background to the Treaty, see BUICK, supra note 85; P.  
MOON, ORIGINS OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1914); RUTHERFORD, supra note 
85. 
 151. Wi Parata v. The Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 N.Z. Jurist Reports 
(New Series) 72. 
 152. Tapu, customs, and lore fulfilled the functions of laws found in more 
complex societies. 
 153. F. M. Brookfield, Kelsen, The Constitution and the Treaty, 15 N.Z.U. L.  
REV. 163, 175 (1992). 
 154. Id. 
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achieved in the absence of an entrenched Constitution and a 
strong Supreme Court of the American model.155   
Lord Woolf, in his 1994 Mann lecture, subscribed to the opin-
ion, which is gradually gaining ground, that there are some 
fundamentals that even the Westminster Parliament cannot 
abolish.156  The traditional doctrine of supremacy of Parliament, 
however, holds that there is nothing that Parliament cannot 
do.157   
The time may have come for the courts to give judicial recog-
nition to the Treaty of Waitangi, as Professor Whatarangi 
Winiata, among others, has called upon them to do.158  There 
have been clear signs that Lord Cooke of Thorndon, while 
President of the Court of Appeal, was inclined to reconsider the 
position of the Treaty.159  Such a significant step remains, how-
ever, unlikely.160  In the meantime, the Crown and the Maori 
remain in a form of political or legal symbiosis through their 
Treaty relationship.   
In light of the strong Pakeha  opposition to the Maori claims 
under the existing Treaty,161 it is uncertain whether there 
would be sufficient support for a simple transfer of Treaty obli-
gations to a new regime.  More importantly, many Maori still 
view the Treaty as an obligation assumed by the Crown, and 
not solely by the government of New Zealand.162   
  
 155. F.M. Brookfield, A New Zealand Republic?, 8 LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 5  
(1994). 
 156. See Robert Lindsay, The Australian Janus: The Face of the Refugee 
Convention or the Unacceptable Face of the Migration Act?, at 
http://www.ntu.edu.au/faculties/lba/schools/Law/apl/Retreating/lindsay.htm 
(amended Feb. 21, 1997) (quoting Lord Woolf). 
 157. See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: 
Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111, _ (1985).   
 158. Whatarangi Winiata, Revolution by Lawful Means, in 2 THE LAW AND 
POLITICS: LAW CONFERENCE PAPERS 13, 16–18 (New Zealand Law Conference 
1993). 
 159. See Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v. Attorney-General [1993] 
2 N.Z.L.R. 301, 305. 
 160. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 161. See generally Paul Perry & Alan Webster, New Zealand Politics at the 
Turn of the Millennium: Attitudes and Values about Politics and Government 
75 (1999). 
 162. Hayward, supra note 4, at 233–34. 
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IV. MAORI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CROWN 
The Treaty of Waitangi may legally have ceded sovereignty, 
but it should be seen as part of the British government’s stated 
intention to take possession of the country only with the con-
sent of the Maori chiefs.163  Since the 1770s, Maori contact with 
British officers had given them an understanding of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of coming under the Queen’s protec-
tion.164  It is clear that in signing the Treaty of Waitangi, they 
saw themselves as reinforcing this link with the Queen and her 
royal predecessors (as well as successors).165   
Maori deputations to the Sovereign, in 1882 and 1884 to 
Queen Victoria,166 and in 1914 and 1924 to King George V to 
seek redress of grievances under the Treaty, must be seen in 
this context.167  The Maori did not consider that the Queen had 
signed in any other capacity than the chiefs themselves had 
signed.168  Thus they may not have fully appreciated that al-
though the Treaty was signed on behalf of Queen Victoria, the 
political capacity of the Sovereign was exercised by her Minis-
ters on her behalf.169  
Each of the deputations was referred by the Ministers in the 
United Kingdom to the colonial Ministers in Wellington, on 
whose advice the Sovereign was now acting in matters affecting 
his or her Maori subjects.170 Whether this was a correct position 
  
 163. Marquis of Normanby to Hobson, Aug. 14, 1839, supra note 83, at 38–
39. 
 164. See RANGINUI WALKER, KA WHAWHAI TONU MATOU : STRUGGLE WITHOUT 
END 94–95 (1990) [hereinafter STRUGGLE]. 
 165. See Cox, supra note 8, at 109. 
 166. See STRUGGLE , supra note 164, at 160, 163 (1990). 
 167. See id. at 165. 
 168. See Cox, supra note 8, at 109. 
 169. See id.  Indeed, they were encouraged to see the Treaty as an agree-
ment with the Queen.  Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 170. In a similar way, efforts were made to seek the involvement of the 
United Kingdom Parliament on behalf of the Canadian Indians during the 
1981–82 patriation process.  The courts had to rule that the treaty obligations 
to natives were now the responsibility of the government and Parliament of 
Canada.  See The Queen v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 1982 Q.B. 892, 926 (Eng. C.A.); Douglas E. Sanders, The Indian 
Lobby, in AND NO ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION ACT 301, 322–323 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 
1983). 
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to take in the late nineteenth century is doubtful.171 It is cer-
tain, however, that today any attempt to seek recourse to the 
Sovereign personally will be referred to the appropriate New 
Zealand Minister.172 
The Crown’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi are 
now exclusively the concern of the Crown in right of New Zea-
land.173 However, the personal involvement of the Sovereign as 
a party to the Treaty remains important to the Maori.  This is 
illustrated by the strongly asserted Maori appeal to Her present 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth in 1984 to “honour the Treaty.”174  
Many Maori share a widely and deeply held view of the Queen 
as the great-granddaughter of Queen Victoria,175 though the 
numbers of people holding this view appear to be in decline.176  
Sir James Henare, a leading Maori elder, informed the Court of 
Appeal that: “[I]t’s a very moot point whether the Maori people 
do love Governments in New Zealand because of what they have 
done in the past . . . .  The Maori people really do have no great 
love for governments but they do for the Crown.”177 
Though this illustrates the confusion over the identity of the 
Crown,178 the existence of such an attitude cannot be ignored.  
Thus, the apology from the Crown, enshrined in the Waikato 
Raupatu Claims Settlement Act of 1995 and signed by the 
Queen in November 1995, was of great symbolic importance.179  
The fact that the apology could not be attributed to Her Majesty 
personally was widely overlooked.180   
  
 171. F.M. Brookfield, A New Zealand Republic?, 8 LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 5  
(1994). 
 172. Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 173. This is shown in the Canadian context in The Queen v. Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1982 Q.B. 892, 926 (C.A.). 
 174. See STRUGGLE , supra note 164, at 234 (1990). 
 175. Interview with David Lange, former Prime Minister, in Auckland, N.Z. 
(May 20, 1998) (on file with author); Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 176. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 177. Statement quoted from the Affidavit of Sir James Henare, May 1, 1987 
(on file with author), which is referred to in New Zealand Maori Council v. 
Attorney-General [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641. 
 178. See Janine Hayward, In Search of a Treaty Partner (1995) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington) (on file with author). 
 179. Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act, 1995 (N.Z.); New Zealand 
Sees New Era Dawn with Queen’s Apology, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) Nov. 4, 
1995. 
 180. Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
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The importance of the British connection remains strong for 
many Maori, who would prefer that the Crown not have an ex-
clusively national identity.181  Some value the perceived inde-
pendence of a transnational institution.182  Indeed, some have 
continued to see the Treaty as an agreement with the United 
Kingdom, rather than with the New Zealand government.183  
Thus, although the Crown may have evolved into the “New Zea-
land Crown,” to many Maori this might be unwelcome, if it 
means the increased subordination of the head of state to the 
political government in Wellington.184   
The legal status of the Treaty of Waitangi is secondary to how 
it is perceived by Maori.185 Whatever the legal effect of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, the chiefs yielded, voluntarily or not, ka-
wanatanga to the Queen.186  It appears to be a widespread 
Maori belief that the Treaty was with the Crown, and that this 
link should not be amended, let alone severed, unilaterally — 
i.e., the Maori would have to be consulted before the govern-
ment decided any change.187 
The Treaty dispute settlement process has encouraged con-
sideration of the system of government — of the constitution in 
  
 181. Id.; Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 182. Jane Kelsey, The Agenda for Change — the Effect and Implications of 
MMP and Republicanism on Treaty Settlement Methods and the Effect on the 
Treaty with the Crown, paper presented to the Institute for International Af-
fairs, Wellington (May 17–18, 1995) (on file with author).  It was partly for 
this reason that Maori opposed the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council.  Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 183. See Confederation of United Tribes of New Zealand, Historical Brief, at 
http://www.nzaif.com/historical_brief.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002). 
 184. See McHugh, supra note 60, at 41–42. 
 185. The Royal Commission on the Electoral System concluded that Mixed 
Member Proportional Representation (“MMP”) would obviate the need for 
Maori seats, indicating a lack of appreciation of the different perceptions of 
Maori; ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM “TOWARDS A BETTER DEMOCRACY” 81–
97 (1986); Interview with Sir Paul Reeves, former Governor-General, in Auck-
land, N.Z. (Nov. 11, 1998) (on file with author). 
 186. Kawanatanga, or “governance,” is often used interchangeably with the 
term “sovereignty.”  See Brookfield, supra note 135, at 4.  Though, in some 
parts of the country this only occurred as late as the latter years of the nine-
teenth century. 
 187. Kelsey, supra note 182. 
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general, and that of the Maori in particular.188  The relationship 
between Crown and the Maori people is a regular subject of dis-
cussion in marae.189  Because the legitimacy of the government 
in New Zealand is based, at least in part, on the Treaty of Wai-
tangi, a commonly held Maori position is that the government 
has no right to make any change in its constitutional status 
without their consent.190  There appears to be no more agree-
ment among Maori than there is in the general population 
about the future direction of government, but there is a concern 
to preserve any structures or institutions that bolster the eco-
nomic or social status of Maori.191  General constitutional re-
form must precede or be integral to any move to a republic.  
This reform should include a consideration of tino rangati-
ratanga and kawanatanga.192  Nor would a move to a republic 
absolve a future government of its Treaty obligations,193 al-
though some have advocated a republic for the purpose of end-
ing these obligations.194  There has been a fear expressed that 
governments could be using republicanism to evade Treaty re-
sponsibilities.195  An example would be cutting appeals to the 
Privy Council, which is regarded as an external channel for re-
  
 188. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129; Interview with Sir Paul Reeves, 
former Governor-General, in Auckland, N.Z. (Nov. 11, 1998) (on file with au-
thor).  Examples are the constitutional proposals of the Rt. Hon. Mike Moore.  
M. Moore, Explanation: New Zealand Constitutional [People’s] Convention Bill 
1998 (Feb. 11, 1998) (on file with author). 
 189. “Tribal meeting houses.”  This is true of the Ngati Tuwharetoa at least.  
Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 190. Graham Interview, supra note 10. 
 191. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 192. See Kelsey, supra note 182, at 12–13.  Tino rangatiratanga, defined in 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 as a people’s “full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties,” 
Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 (N.Z.), is often defined more broadly to mean 
“sovereignty,” Brookfield, supra note 135, at 4. 
 193. See sources cited supra note 192.  See also Andrew P. Stockley, Parlia-
ment, Crown and Treaty: Inextricably Linked?, 17 N.Z.U. L. REV. 193, 212 
(1996). 
 194. See, e.g., Stephen Morris, Letter to the Editor of the NEW ZEALAND 
HERALD, June 21, 1999 (on file with author).  This may also be implicit in the 
policy of the New Zealand Libertarians, which advocates “abolish[ing] the 
institutionalised apartheid that currently exists in New Zealand.”  See Liber-
tariaNZ: Less Government, LAW TALK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 24.   
 195. Andrea Tunks, Mana Tiriti, in REPUBLICANISM IN NEW ZEALAND 117 
(Luke Trainor ed., 1996).   
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dress196 and formally as an appeal to the Crown.197  Without 
specific concurrence from the Maori as the Treaty partner with 
the Crown, the abolition of the monarchy would appear to lack 
legitimacy.198 
Formerly it might be said that the traditional national iden-
tity of New Zealand was one of a people with one culture, that 
culture being, predominantly, Pakeha .199  This is no longer so, 
but just what the New Zealand identity is remains uncertain.200  
Especially since the 1970s, the liberal democratic ethos has 
generated what Jane Kelsey calls an integration ethic and a 
self-determination ethic — an attempt to incorporate Maori into 
the Pakeha  majority, while preserving their separate identity.201  
These two views may ultimately prove impossible to reconcile.202   
Both racial groups, however, are linked by the concept of the 
Crown, as it is variously understood.  The argument that the 
Crown, as a party to the Treaty of Waitangi, is a fundamental 
postulate of the New Zealand constitution is important,203 even 
if it is exaggerated.   
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed the thesis that the legitimacy of the 
British Crown in New Zealand is derived, in part, from its part-
nership with the tangata whenua204 in the Treaty of Waitangi.  
  
 196. Again, this attitude is not an indication of support for the monarchy, 
but of appreciation of the advantages of the Crown to a minority.  Te Heuheu 
Interview, supra note 129.  See, e.g., New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-
General of New Zealand [1994] 1 A.C. 466 (P.C. 1994). 
 197. Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41 (U.K.); Judicial 
Committee Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 69 (U.K.); Judicial Committee Act, 1881, 
44 & 45 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
 198. Robin Cooke, The Suggested Revolution against the Crown, in ESSAYS 
ON THE CONSTITUTION 28, 38 (Philip Joseph ed., 1995). 
 199. Kelsey, supra note 75, at 185. 
 200. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129. 
 201. Kelsey, supra note 75, at 185, 192–93. 
 202. See also BRUCE CLARK, NATIVE LIBERTY, CROWN SUPREMACY — THE 
EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 191 (1990); A. 
Ward, Historical Claims under the Treaty of Waitangi, 27 J. OF PACIFIC 
HISTORY 181 (1993). 
 203. Cooke, supra note 198, at 35–37. 
 204. See sources cited supra note 3. 
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This partnership is a major source of non-traditional legitimacy 
that depends not on popularity but on perception.205 
Similarly, the establishment of Canada was founded to some 
degree on a series of treaties between the Crown and the native 
American people.  The obligations under these treaties have 
been assumed by the Canadian authorities, but in such a way 
that the British Crown remains central to the relationship.  
Parallels are less clear in Australia, where the native peoples 
generally lacked the same treaty relationship with the Crown. 
Retention of the “uncomfortable” idea that the Crown is sov-
ereign avoids the problems inherent in a legal notion of popular 
sovereignty.  Both Maori and Pakeha  are under the Crown, 
which owes a special duty to the Maori as partners in the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
From the Maori perspective there are perhaps two questions 
central to any republican debate in New Zealand: who or what 
is the Crown and, more specifically, what is its function under 
the Treaty of Waitangi?206  It continues to be, and in fact ap-
pears increasingly imperative to the Maori, that the Crown is 
not only something other than the government of the day,207 but 
that the Crown is able to function in such a manner as to hold 
the government to the guarantees made under the Treaty of 
Waitangi.208  The Crown is, at the very least, something distinct 
from the political government.  Nor can it, as a Treaty partner, 
be equated with a State or the people, since it involves the pres-
ervation of a special relationship with one sector of society — 
the Maori. 
The legitimacy of the present regime relies, at least in part, 
on a compact between the Crown and the Maori, as a basis for 
the assumption and continuation of sovereignty.  Whether the 
Maori can be said to have actually benefitted from this cession 
to the Crown, and from the subsequent artificial distinction 
drawn between the Crown and government, is problematic.  The 
  
 205. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND 1990 COMMISSION, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: 
THE SYMBOL OF OUR LIFE TOGETHER AS A NATION (1989); DOUGLAS GRAHAM, 
TRICK OR TREATY? (1997). 
 206. Hayward, supra note 178. 
 207. Te Heuheu Interview, supra note 129.  Sometimes the Crown meant 
the government of the day, sometimes more.  Graham Interview, supra note 
10.  See also Hayward, supra note 178. 
 208. Hayward, supra note 4, at 233–234. 
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British government would probably have been extended to New 
Zealand in any event, but the way in which it was done was im-
portant. 
The perception the nineteenth century Maori had of the 
Crown was determined by their own cultural heritage and the 
way in which they perceived Queen Victoria's role.  This percep-
tion differed markedly from that of the settlers or the  British or 
colonial government.  But the perception is more important 
than the reality.  If the reality is that the Maori must negotiate 
with governments that owe their authority solely to the general, 
predominantly European population, then the majority ambiva-
lence or hostility to the principles of the Treaty present real 
problems for Maori wishing to enforce the Treaty of Waitangi.  
The result is that, for pragmatic reasons alone, many Maori 
remain attached to the concept of the Crown.  This is so even 
though the Treaty of Waitangi may itself be an insubstantial 
basis for a modern constitution.209 The Crown may not be essen-
tial to the body politic, but its removal would raise questions of 
the role of Maori in society and government, which many, not 
least of all political leaders, would prefer to avoid. 
  
 209. Pepperell, supra note 2 (quoting Simon Upton, Member of Parliament, 
Address before the Parliament of New Zealand, Dec. 12, 2000). 
